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II. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
Plaintiff responds to Defendants' Statement of Facts with 
the following additional facts under the general headings 
utilized in Defendants' brief. 
Creation of Norman Anderson Trust. 
1. Anna Lee Anderson ("Anna Lee") did not read the Norman 
Anderson Trust Agreement subsequent to its execution by Norman 
Anderson on November 20, 1978 and has no recollection of ever 
having read the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement at any time. 
(Rec. 1450) 
2. Anna Lee admits to having read a letter dated November 
17, 1978 addressed to she and Norman Anderson from Ron Cutshall, 
a local attorney. (Rec. 1449) 
3. The Cutshall letter mentions nothing about the power of 
the Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust to engage in margin 
business. (Rec. 1449) 
4. Notwithstanding her review of the Cutshall letter, Anna 
Lee's lack of understanding of her deceased husband's estate plan 
is self-evident. For example, Anna Lee believed that her son, 
Jim, was one of the beneficiaries of her deceased husband's 
estate and would receive his share of the estate prior to her 
husband's death. (Rec. 1450) Anna Lee did not believe that the 
Marital Trust and Family Trust were integrated into the Norman 
Anderson Trust document. (Rec. 1451) Anna Lee believed that she 
and her son were the beneficiaries of the Marital Trust and that 
she was the sole beneficiary of the Family Trust. (Rec. 1452) 
1 
These assumptions were entirely inaccurate. 
5. James Anderson, Anna Lee's son, never discussed the 
limitations on his authority as the Trustee of the Norman 
Anderson Trust to margin the stock in the trust account. (Rec. 
1458) 
Opening of Brokerage Account for Norman Anderson Trust. 
6. Ralph Pahnke knew that it was Dean Witter's 
responsibility to procure a copy of the trust agreement when he 
established an account on behalf of a trust. (Rec. 13 60) 
7. Mr. Pahnke independently reviewed the Norman Anderson 
Trust Agreement, inter alia, to verify the identity of the 
trustee. (Rec. 1362) 
8. Mr. Pahnke understood that if an account were 
established on the part of a trust, Dean Witter policy required 
Mr. Pahnke to forward the trust agreement to the San Francisco 
Operations Center for review, even if the trustee had already 
signed a margin agreement. (Rec. 1362) 
9. Mr. Pahnke also understood that pursuant to Dean Witter 
policy, margin transactions could not occur within a trust 
account without approval from the Dean Witter Operations Center 
in San Francisco, California. (Rec. 1361) 
10. There was never an amendment to the Norman Anderson 
Trust that would provide for margin borrowing. (Rec. 1368) 
11. Mr. Pahnke understood that if he received a mandate 
that an account could be opened on a "cash account only" basis, 
he could not margin the securities in that account. (Rec. 1364) 
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12. Mr. Pahnke admits that he educated Jim Anderson, 
Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust, regarding how he could 
access cash against the securities in the account through 
margining them without the necessity of selling the securities. 
(Rec. 1366) 
13. Kathy Barnett, Dean Witter's operations supervisor 
responsible for reviewing trust documents during the relevant 
period, understood that her function was to review trust 
agreements when they were forwarded to her by branch offices and 
approve them. (Rec. 1383-84) 
14. Ms. Barnett reviewed, within the Norman Anderson Trust 
Agreement, the Trustee's Powers and Trustee's Designation, in 
part, to determine whether or not the Trustee was authorized to 
establish a margin account. (Rec. 1390) 
15. Ms. Barnett, pursuant to Dean Witter policy and 
industry standards, would only approve margin business if the 
trust instrument specifically used the word "margin". (Rec. 
1386) 
16. Approval was never given to Mr. Pahnke to margin the 
securities in the Norman Anderson Trust. (Rec. 1365) 
17. Ms. Barnett testified that if the Norman Anderson Trust 
had been approved for margin business, she would have located in 
her records a wire which approved either the trust instrument 
itself or an amendment to the trust, which would have been sent 
to the branch office to approve margin trading. No such document 
was located. (Rec. 1388) 
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18. The Dean Witter Compliance Department requested an 
independent review of the Norman Anderson Trust instrument in 
August, 1979. Ms. Barnett is not aware of the purpose or scope 
of that review. (Rec. 1395-96) 
Letter of Authorization. 
19. Mr. Pahnke admits that the assets of the Norman 
Anderson Trust were distributed pursuant to a Letter of 
Authorization dated April 22, 1980. (Rec. 1369) 
20. Notwithstanding Mr. Pahnke's contention that Mr. 
Anderson "dictated" the Letter of Authorization distributing the 
assets, he admits that the entirety of the text of the letter is 
in his handwriting and is written on Dean Witter Reynold's 
letterhead. (Rec. 1369) 
21. Furthermore, Mr. Pahnke cannot explain why Mr. Anderson 
did not simply write the Letter of Authorization himself as 
opposed to having Mr. Pahnke transcribe it. (Rec. 1370) 
22. Mr. Pahnke cannot explain why he did not have Jim 
Anderson sign the Letter of Authorization in his capacity as 
Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust. (Rec. 1373) 
23. Mr. Pahnke admits that at the time he prepared the 
Letter of Authorization, he believed that a portion of the assets 
of the Norman Anderson Trust were being distributed to the 
"Marital Trust". (Rec. 1374) 
24. Mr. Pahnke also believed that Jim Anderson's personal 
account was actually the "Family Trust", contrary to the express 
terms of the Trust instrument. (Rec. 1375) 
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25. Mr. Pahnke never established accounts in the name of 
either the Marital Trust or the Family Trust. (Rec. 1377) 
26. Even though Mr. Pahnke understood that the 
distributions from the Norman Anderson Trust were being 
transferred into the "Marital Trust" and "Family Trust", he did 
not take steps to procure a copy of the trust agreements for 
these trusts, forward them to San Francisco to be reviewed for 
margin approval, or verify that James Anderson was the Trustee 
and had the authority to margin the securities in the accounts. 
(Rec. 1375) In fact, Mr. Pahnke did not even know if James 
Anderson was the Trustee of the Marital Trust or the Family 
Trust. (Rec. 1376) 
27. In truth and fact, the assets of the Norman Anderson 
Trust were actually transferred into the personal margin account 
of the Trustee and an independent margin account. (Rec. 1372) 
28. Ms. Barnett's involvement with respect to the transfer 
of assets from one trust account to another would be to approve 
each of the trusts. If there was not a request to approve margin 
trading in the transferee trust account, she would approve the 
account for cash business only. (Rec. 1393) 
29. Defendant Pahnke admits that he was aware of Dean 
Witter policies governing the opening and handling of trust 
accounts at the time the stock was distributed from the Norman 
Anderson Trust account. (Rec. 1359) 
30. Joan L. Lavell, one of Defendants' compliance experts, 
acknowledges that during the relevant period, if a trustee wished 
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to engage in margin business, industry standards required a 
separate review and affirmation that those types of transactions 
were permitted within the trust. (Rec. 1398) 
31. Ms. Lavell also recognized as an industry-wide practice 
that if margin positions were being moved to another account that 
the firm would want to ensure that the receiving account was 
qualified for margin business. (Rec. 1400) 
32. Ms. Lavell further recognized that if a customer were 
to instruct his broker to transfer shares from one account to 
another and alerted the broker to the fact that the accounts to 
which shares were being transferred were trust accounts (as was 
the case with Defendant Pahnke), industry standards would require 
a review and approval process for those receiving accounts 
similar to that associated with opening a new trust account. 
(Rec. 1401-02) 
33. Ms. Lavell recognized that it was an industry practice 
to establish an account on behalf of a trust in the name of the 
trustee. It would not include the name of the beneficiary. 
(Rec. 1407) Despite the fact that Defendant Pahnke "understood" 
that the accounts to which the Norman Anderson Trust assets were 
transferred were trust accounts, he established the accounts 
under different names including the individual name of the 
Trustee. (Rec. 1123) 
34. Ms. Lavell also recognized the fact that the 
brokerage industry does not maintain trust accounts in the names 
of individuals. (Rec. 1403-04) 
6 
35. Also during the relevant period, industry standards 
required that until the trust had gone through a review and 
approval process, the account would only be permitted to do cash 
business. (Rec. 1398) Despite approval for a "cash account 
only" with respect to the Norman Anderson Trust assets, and the 
failure to seek any review of the Marital or Family Trust 
agreements, Defendants caused the assets in each of the trusts to 
be improperly margined. (Rec. 1022, 1081, 1123) 
36. Allan Rockier is another compliance expert engaged by 
Defendants to offer his opinions in this matter. Mr. Rockier 
was also asked to opine relative to whether Dean Witter breached 
industry standards by permitting margin borrowing from the Norman 
Anderson Trust, Anna Lee Anderson Trust or James Anderson's 
personal account. (Rec. 1411) 
37. Mr. Rockier testified that any account that is on 
margin that has not been approved for margin business would be 
identified by a computer run. (Rec. 1420) 
38. Mr. Rockier testified that every account in every 
brokerage firm goes through a review and approval process. (Rec. 
1412) He further testified that most firms utilize the same 
approach to approving trust accounts for margin trading. Id. 
39. Mr. Rockier testified that in every single firm of 
which he is aware, in order to conduct margin business in a 
fiduciary account, it is first necessary to obtain approval from 
the legal department. (Rec. 1413-14) 
40. Mr. Rockier further testified that when approval is 
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obtained for a legal or fiduciary account, approval has to come 
from some kind of a legal entity such as a compliance or legal 
department so as to ensure that the trustee has the power to 
margin securities in the account. (Rec. 1422-23) Mr. 
41. Mr. Rockier further recognized that there are two 
standards of review for margin accounts. First, a non-fiduciary 
account would be reviewed for suitability, to-wit: "Whether or 
not you are a little old lady who shouldn't be on margin". (Rec. 
1421) 
42. If a statement is issued with an indication of margin 
account status on it, it would either indicate that the account 
had some sort of approval or that the computer didn't pick up 
that there was a mistake or error. (Rec. 1424) 
43. Notwithstanding the restrictions on the Trustee's power 
to conduct margin business, the letter authored by Defendant 
Pahnke transferring the assets out of the Norman Anderson Trust 
put the assets into two separate margin accounts. (Rec. 1123) 
Account Activity. 
44. Following the distribution of assets from the Norman 
Anderson Trust to the personal account of the Trustee and an 
independent margin account, the Trustee utilized the assets as 
his own. He represented the entirety of the assets as being 
owned by him personally on his financial statements. (Rec. 1566) 
45. With respect to having represented to lenders of Jim 
Anderson that dividend income which actually belonged to the 
trust was income for Mr. Anderson personally, Mr. Pahnke replied: 
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"If I did that, it was because Jim Anderson asked me to do it". 
(Rec. 1379) 
Plaintiff's Knowledge of the Loss of the Levi Stock. 
46. Jim Anderson never told Anna Lee that he was 
appropriating money from trusts established for her benefit nor 
did he discuss the concept of borrowing on margin with her. In 
fact, Anna Lee did not know what "margin" was and Jim had never 
mentioned that word. (Rec. 1454) 
47. Anna Lee believed that her son was affluent and able to 
afford the lifestyle he enjoyed because of his independent 
investments in stock, property and businesses he had developed 
and worked with. (Rec. 1455) 
48. Statements for the Norman Anderson Trust, the James N. 
Anderson personal account and the Anna Lee Anderson Trust were 
.sent to the Trustee, James N. Anderson, and not Anna Lee 
Anderson. (Rec. 1489) 
49. In explaining that all of the Levi Stock had been lost, 
James Anderson explained to Anna Lee that the stock had been lost 
due to a "market crash." (Rec. 1459) 
50. Defendant Pahnke also attributed the losses in the 
account to market conditions. (Rec. 1462) 
51. James Anderson never told Anna Lee that he had 
transferred stock out of the Norman Anderson Trust in violation 
of the trust agreement. (Rec. 1459) 
52. In explaining the loss of the Levi stock, James 
Anderson gave Anna Lee no indication and/or reason to believe 
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that the losses were the fault of Dean Witter and/or himself. 
(Rec. 1459) 
53. Plaintiff, Anna Lee Anderson, regularly spoke with 
Defendant Pahnke about getting money from her Trust Account at 
Dean Witter. (Rec. 1448) 
54. Defendant's expert, Allan Rockier, recognizes that it 
is inappropriate for a stock broker to deal directly with the 
beneficiary of a trust. (Rec. 1417-18) Mr. Rockier further 
acknowledged that a party having knowledge of a violation of 
industry standards or policy has a corresponding duty to 
affirmatively act. (Rec. 1415) Defendant Pahnke did nothing to 
alert Plaintiff to his many violations of policy and industry 
standards. 
Arbitration Proceedings. 
55. The arbitrators in the proceeding between the 
Trustee of the Anna Lee Anderson Trust and Defendants herein 
affirmatively indicated that the claim which is the subject of 
this lawsuit needed to be brought by the beneficiary in a 
separate law suit. (Rec. 1352) 
56. At the arbitration hearing held in December, 1990, 
after attempting to raise the claim presented in the present 
action following its discovery several days earlier, the 
arbitrator commented: "Let me see if I understand what you are 
saying. That Mr. Anderson took a fall in distribution from the 
Norman Anderson Trust and he was helped by that or helped in 
doing that by Dean Witter and you are desiring Dean Witter to— 
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why is that a claim other than by the beneficiary? Why is the 
Trustee entitled to raise a claim like that? " (Rec. 1564) 
57. Improper margin business was not a claim involved in 
the prior arbitration between the Trustee of the Anna Lee 
Anderson Trust and Defendants herein, nor was Plaintiff a party 
thereto. (Rec. 1425-43) 
58. At the arbitration hearing held in December, 1990, 
Defendants' counsel, Joe Palmer, stated with respect to the claim 
presented in the present lawsuit: "If he wants to assert that 
claim at a later time, file the pleadings and then we'll go ahead 
and we'll try that case...". (Rec. 1565) 
59. The Anna Lee Anderson Trust had equity of approximately 
$880,000.00 prior to the April 22, 1980 distribution of stock 
from the Norman Anderson Trust account. Consequently, the 
arbitration proceeding involved assets independent of those 
received from the Norman Anderson Trust. (Rec. 1562 & 1570) 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ANNA LEE HAS STANDING TO BRING HER CLAIMS. 
This Court has already determined that Anna Lee has standing 
to bring these claims. Nevertheless, Defendants continue to 
contend that Anna Lee lacks standing. Defendants argue that Anna 
Lee's standing to bring suit is dependent upon evidence that open 
hostility existed between she and the Trustee, James Anderson. 
Defendants' argument misapprehends this Court's prior decision, 
wherein this Court stated that ". . .it appears the beneficiary 
has the right to bring an action against a third party when the 
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beneficiary's interests are hostile to those of the trustee." 
Anderson, 841 P.2d at 745 (citing: Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. 
Klemm, 76 Utah 372, 290 P. 161 (1930) (emphasis added). The 
Court's holding requires only that the interests of the 
beneficiary and the trustee are hostile, not that personal 
hostility exist between the parties.1 
In the present case, there can be no question that Anna 
Lee's interests were hostile to those of the Trustee. Indeed, 
the Trustee's "interests" resulted in great financial benefit to 
him, including new homes, vehicles, business dealings and real 
property, at the expense of Anna Lee's entire inheritance. The 
Trustee's "interests" were the driving force that persuaded 
Defendants to place the Norman Anderson Trust Funds, of which 
Anna Lee was the sole beneficiary, into margin accounts against 
which the Trustee was allowed to borrow heavily for his own 
personal benefit. The Trustee breached his fiduciary duty to the 
beneficiary by utilizing the trust funds for his own personal 
gain in direct contravention of the beneficiary's interests. 
Dean Witter knowingly facilitated the Trustee's breach of trust 
by transferring the trust funds into unauthorized margin 
1
 Defendants' reliance upon Velez v. Feinstein, 451 
N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y.App. Div. 1982) for the proposition that open 
hostility must exist between the Trustee and the beneficiary is 
misplaced. Velez allows a beneficiary to bring suit against a 
third party upon "a showing of a demand on the trustees to bring 
the suit, and of a refusal so unjustifiable as to constitute an 
abuse of the trustee's discretion, or a showing that suit should 
be brought and that because of the trustees' conflict of 
interest, or some other reason, it is futile to make such a 
demand." 451 N.Y.S.2d at 115. In the present case, the 
trustee's conflict of interest is apparent. 
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accounts• In so doing, Dean Witter committed a breach of trust 
as well. 
Defendants' activities, in promoting the interests of the 
Trustee at the expense of Anna Lee's interests, were all 
conducted without Anna Lee's knowledge, and most certainly 
without her acceptance or approval. As a result of the 
Defendants' conduct, the Norman Anderson Trust funds were lost, 
and Anna Lee was left penniless. The pleadings and the testimony 
received are replete with facts and evidence which establish that 
Anna Lee's interests were hostile to those of the Trustee. 
Consequently, Anna Lee has standing, as the beneficiary of the 
Norman Anderson Trust, to bring these claims. 
As additional support for its holding that Anna Lee has 
standing as a beneficiary to raise these claims against 
Defendants, this Court recognized that "other jurisdictions allow 
a beneficiary to sue third parties directly." 841 P.2d at 
(citing: Alioto v. United States, 593 F.Supp. 1402, 1412 (N.D. 
Cal. 1984) (where beneficiary has been damaged by trustee and 
third party, beneficiary may bring action against third party 
separately); Booth v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 F.Supp. 
755, 761 (D.N.J. 1957) (where trustee transfers property in 
breach of trust with assistance of third parties, third parties 
are primarily liable to the beneficiary, rather than to the 
trustee; the right of the beneficiary against the third party is 
a direct right not derived through the trustee); Hoyle v. 
Dickinson, 746 P.2d 18, 20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (trust 
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beneficiary may bring action for damages against third party for 
breach of trust agreement; Appollinari v. Johnson, 305 N.W.2d 
565, 567 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (beneficiary may sue third party 
without joining trustee). This Court further held that the 
Trustee's failure to bring suit against Defendants provided Anna 
Lee with an additional basis for standing to sue in this matter: 
In the present situation, it is clear from the complaint the 
beneficiary could prove facts showing she had standing to 
bring suit against the third parties for the improper 
distribution of stock. She could show, at the very least, 
the trustee improperly 'neglected' to bring action against 
the appellees when he waited over ten years after the 
improper transfer and still did not bring suit. 
Anna Lee Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, (Utah App. 1992) 
(emphasis added) (citing: Struble v. New jersey Brewery 
Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 337 (3rd Cir. 1984) 
(where trustee may sue and wrongfully fails to do so, the 
beneficiary may sue the party or parties the trustee failed to 
sue). Based upon this Court's prior ruling, and the abundance of 
authority relied upon and cited therein, the trial court's 
finding that Anna Lee lacks standing to bring this suit is in 
error and should be reversed. 
II. ANNA LEE'S CLAIMS ARE NOT TIME BARRED. 
A. Anna Lee Need Not Establish that the Trustee Knowingly 
Breached the Trust in Order to Maintain this Action 
Against Defendants. 
Notwithstanding Defendants' contention that Anna Lee's 
claims are barred by the statute of limitations, Defendants 
recognize that pursuant to Section 327 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, a beneficiary may bring suit even when the 
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Trustee is time-barred. Defendants contend, however, that in 
order for the exception under Section 327 of the Restatement to 
apply, Anna Lee must establish that the Trustee knowingly 
breached the trust. This contention is simply wrong. Section 
327 of the Restatement allows a beneficiary to maintain an action 
against a third person if. (1) the third person knowingly 
participated in a breach of trust and (2) the beneficiary is not 
guilty of laches. See, Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §327. 
This exception to the general rule prohibiting beneficiaries 
from maintaining suit against third parties clearly does not 
require the beneficiary to establish that the trustee knowingly 
breached the trust, as asserted by Defendants. Nevertheless, in 
the present case the Trustee's "knowing" participation is 
evidenced throughout the record. 
B. Defendants Had Actual Knowledge that the Trustee Was 
Exceeding His Authority in Margining The Norman 
Anderson Trust Funds. 
Defendants' assertion that they had no knowledge of the 
Trustee's breach of trust is incredible. It is undisputed that 
the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement was reviewed by at least 
three separate levels of the Dean Witter bureaucracy. 
z
 Defendants have spent endless time and energy 
establishing that the Trustee had full knowledge of the breach. 
They now come full circle and proclaim that it is undisputed that 
he did not know. See, Brief of Appellees, pp. 29-30. 
Notwithstanding the Trustee's self-serving declaration that he 
innocently violated the Trust agreement, Defendants' discovery of 
notes of conversations had between the Trustee and professionals 
he employed manifests a clear understanding of the distribution 
scheme of the Norman Anderson Trust. Any subsequent disposition 
of assets by the Trustee, contrary to that understanding, was 
clearly "with knowledge". 
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Notwithstanding this admitted fact, Defendants continue to deny 
any knowledge of the contents of the Trust or the limitations on 
the Trustee's authority as prescribed therein. Curiously, 
however, subsequent to their review of the Norman Anderson Trust 
agreement, Defendants approved the Trust funds for "cash" 
business only. (Rec. 1061 & 1066) Even more curious is the 
undisputed fact that Defendants never approved the Norman 
Anderson Trust funds for "margin" business. (Rec. 1083-84) 
Notwithstanding these crucial facts, it is undisputed that 
Defendants transferred the trust funds into margin accounts, 
where they were margined and ultimately lost as a result of 
margin calls. Defendants knew, based upon their review of the 
Trust document, that the Norman Anderson Trust funds could not be 
margined. This fact is evidenced by Defendants' approval of the 
Trust funds for cash business only, and the Trustor's failure to 
amend the Trust to allow the Trustee to conduct margin business. 
Possessed of this knowledge, Defendants improperly transferred 
the funds into unauthorized margin accounts and allowed the 
Trustee to access those funds for his own personal benefit until 
the funds were entirely depleted. The knowledge of Defendants is 
obvious. 
C. Anna Lee is Not Guilty of Laches, 
Anna Lee was informed in 1984 that she had sustained losses. 
She was also told why. A radical decline in the market had wiped 
out the equity in her account. She was never told that the 
margining of her trust funds was improper or that compliance with 
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industry standards and Dean Witter policies would have prevented 
the funds from being margined. She was never informed that 
violations of industry standards and Dean Witter policies had 
facilitated the deposit of the funds into the wrong accounts. 
She had no way of knowing any of this. She never received 
account statements. She never saw the Letter of Authorization 
handwritten by Defendant Pahnke and signed by her Trustee/son 
which put the money in the wrong accounts. All material 
information was concealed. She was simply given a false, yet 
believable, explanation. Due to the nature of their 
relationship, Defendants and the Trustee had an affirmative duty 
to disclose these material facts to Plaintiff. See, Centerre 
Bank of Independence v. Bliss, 765 S.W. 2d 276 (Mo. App. 1988). 
Anna Lee first learned that Defendants transferred the 
Norman Anderson Trust funds into unauthorized margin accounts, 
and thereafter allowed the Trustee to improperly access the 
funds, in December 1990. (Rec. 1136-37) Within days of learning 
this information, Anna Lee filed the present suit. There is 
simply no evidence of delay on Anna Lee's part. 
Finally, Defendants should not be permitted to claim 
prejudice as a result of the passage of time between the events 
giving rise to this suit and the time the suit was filed. Any 
prejudice Defendants may claim from the loss of documents and/or 
the dimming of memories is the result of their own conduct in 
failing to disclose their role in a breach of trust and 
concealing Plaintiff's claims for over ten years. Consequently, 
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Defendants have failed to establish the requisite "lack of 
diligence" on the part of Plaintiff as well as "injury" owing to 
Plaintiff's lack of diligence as required by Utah law. See, 
Plateau Mining Co. v. State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 731 (Utah 1990). 
III. DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY PARTICIPATED WITH THE TRUSTEE IN 
BREACHING FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED TO ANNA LEE AND, IN SO 
DOING, BREACHED THEIR OWN POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AND 
STANDARDS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE INDUSTRY. 
Defendants' claim that they owed no duty to Anna Lee and 
therefore cannot be held liable to her is entirely void of merit. 
Defendants' claim ignores the well-established rule that a third 
party who participates with a fiduciary in a breach of the 
fiduciary's duty is liable to the beneficiary. See, Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, §326 (1976). See also: Seminole Nation v. 
United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942). Defendants' claim that they 
cannot be held liable to Anna Lee unless they personally 
benefitted from the breach is equally void of merit. 
Specifically, " . . . one who, even without breaching any duty 
owed on his own behalf, aids a trustee in breaching the fiduciary 
duty . . . may be held liable as a de facto trustee even if he 
does not benefit from the breach." Wisconsin Real Estate 
Investment Trust v. Weinstein, 509 F.Supp. 1289, 1300 (E.D. Wis. 
1981). See also, U.S. v. Rivieccio, 661 F.Supp. 281, 294 
(E.D.N.Y. 1987). Nevertheless, it is undisputed that Defendants 
received a significant benefit from their participation in the 
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breach of trust. 
Defendants' contention that they lacked ac 1 knowledge of 
the breach of trust and violated no industry st ^ards in 
carrying out the instructions of the Trustee is patently wrong. 
Furthermore, Defendants' contention that the expert witnesses 
agree that Defendants did nothing wrong and had no actual 
knowledge of the breach of trust is a fundamental 
mischaracterization. As set forth below, both the lay and expert 
testimony established that Defendants knowingly violated numerous 
industry standards and guidelines in margining the Norman 
Anderson Trust funds. 
1. Kathy Barnett. 
Kathy Barnett, an operations supervisor for Dean Witter 
during the relevant period, admits that she reviewed, within the 
Norman Anderson Trust Agreement, the Trustee's Powers and 
Trustee's Designation, in part, to determine whether or not the 
Trustee was authorized to establish a margin account. (Rec. 
1390) Ms. Barnett acknowledged that she would only approve 
margin business if the trust instrument specifically used the 
word "margin". (Rec. 1386) Based upon her review of the Norman 
Anderson Trust document, she approved the Trust for "cash" 
business only. Ms. Barnett testified that if the Norman Anderson 
Trust had ever been approved for margin business, she would have 
3
 Defendants' contention that they did not benefit from the 
breach of trust is disingenuous. Defendant Pahnke admitted that 
he made more in commissions off of these margin accounts than off 
of any other customer in his career, and Dean Witter made in 
excess of one million dollars in margin interest. (Rec. 1125) 
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located in her records a wire which approved either the trust 
instrument itself or an amendment to the trust which would have 
been sent to the branch office* (Rec. 1388) No such record was 
ever located. Id. 
Similarly, Ms. Barnett's responsibilities with respect to 
assets transferred from one trust account to another would be to 
review and approve each trust agreement. If she had not been 
asked to approve margin trading in the transferee trust account, 
she would have approved the account for cash business only. 
(Rec. 1393) 
Defendant Pahnke has acknowledged that he was aware of Dean 
Witter policies governing the opening and handling of trust 
accounts at the time the stock was distributed from the Norman 
Anderson Trust account. (Rec. 1359) In spite of his knowledge, 
Mr. Pahnke breached each and every one of the foregoing policies, 
procedures and industry standards, as described by Ms. Barnett. 
Specifically, no one at the operations level of Dean Witter ever 
gave approval to Mr. Pahnke to margin the securities in the 
Norman Anderson Trust. (Rec. 1365) Yet, Defendants allowed 
securities in the trust accounts to be margined. No one at the 
operations level of Dean Witter ever approved the transferee 
accounts, where the Norman Anderson Trust funds were placed, for 
margin business. Notwithstanding that fact, Defendants margined 
the securities after they were transferred into the two 
unapproved transferee accounts. Defendants' actions not only 
assisted the Trustee in breaching his fiduciary duties to Anna 
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Lee, they constituted flagrant departures from Defendants' own 
policies and procedures as well as industry standards. 
2. Joan L. Laveil. 
Joan L. Lavell, one of Defendants' compliance experts, 
acknowledges that during the relevant period, if trust accounts 
wished to engage in margin business, it was first necessary to 
separately review and affirm that those types of transactions 
were permitted within the trust. (Rec. 1398) Ms. Lavell also 
recognized as an industry-wide practice that if margin positions 
were being moved to another account that the firm would want to 
ensure that the receiving account was qualified for margin 
business. (Rec. 1400) Ms. Lavell further recognized that if a 
customer were to instruct his broker to transfer shares from one 
account to another and alerted the broker to the fact that the 
accounts to which shares were being transferred were trust 
accounts, industry standards would require a review and approval 
process for those receiving accounts similar to that associated 
with opening a new trust account. (Rec. 1401-02) 
In the present case, Defendants breached every one of the 
foregoing industry standards. Defendants failed to review the 
Marital and Family Trusts to determine the identity of the 
trustee(s) and whether the trusts provided and/or allowed for 
margin business. Under industry standards and Dean Witter's own 
policies, they did not. Similarly, when the Norman Anderson 
Trust funds were transferred into the Marital and Family Trust 
accounts, Defendants failed to determine if those receiving 
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accounts were authorized for margin activity. They were not. 
Consequently, industry standards required that the accounts be 
permitted to conduct cash business only. (Rec. 1398) 
Although Defendants purported to transfer the Norman 
Anderson Trust funds into the "Marital Trust" and the "Family 
Trust" as required by the trust instrument, the funds were 
actually transferred into the personal margin account of the 
Trustee and a separate margin account. The transferee accounts 
were maintained under the names of "James N. Anderson" and the 
"Anna Lee Anderson Trust". Thus, the Marital and Family Trust 
accounts were maintained under names other than the designated 
trusts, thus allowing the Trustee and Defendants to circumvent 
established policy and industry standards. The accounts were 
immediately allowed to conduct margin business, even though they 
were never reviewed and/or approved for the same. Had they been 
reviewed, industry standards would have prevented their approval 
for margin business, absent an amendment from the Trustor, Norman 
Anderson. Since Norman Anderson was dead, an amendment would 
never have been possible. All of these departures from industry 
standards, which facilitated the breaches of trust, are directly 
attributable to Defendants. 
3. Allan Rockier. 
Allan Rockier is another compliance expert engaged by 
Defendants to offer his opinions in this matter. Mr. Rockier 
was also asked to opine relative to whether Dean Witter breached 
industry standards by permitting margin borrowing from the Norman 
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Anderson Trust, Anna Lee Anderson Trust or James Anderson's 
personal account. (Rec. 141"* Mr. Rockier testified that every 
account in every brokerage firm goes through a review and 
approval process. (Rec. 1412) He further testified that most 
firms have the same approach to approving trust accounts for 
margin trading. (Rec. 1412) Mr. Rockier testified that in every 
single firm of which he is aware, it was first necessary to 
obtain approval from the legal department prior to margining a 
fiduciary account. (Rec. 1413-14) When approval is obtained for 
a fiduciary account, approval has to come from some kind of a 
legal entity such as a compliance or legal department so as to 
ensure that the trustee has the power to margin the securities in 
the account. (Rec. 1422-23) 
In the present case, Defendants obtained no such approval 
and made no attempt to ensure that the Trustee had the power to 
margin the securities in the Norman Anderson Trust account, and 
correspondingly, in the Marital and Family Trust accounts. 
Defendants knew that fiduciary accounts were involved and that 
margin activity was being conducted in those accounts without 
approval. Of the three trusts in question, one was approved for 
"cash" business only (the Norman Anderson Trust) and the other 
two (Marital and Family Trusts) were not even submitted for 
review. Indeed, Defendants did not even bother to determine the 
identity of the trustee of the Marital and/or Family Trusts. 
Defendants' conduct as described herein constitutes a flagrant 
breach of industry standards and Defendants' own policies and 
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procedures• 
Finally, the collusion between Defendants and the Trustee is 
apparent. Defendants knew that the Trustee was benefitting 
personally from the breach of trust. Defendants assisted the 
Trustee in his purchase of a $500,000 home and a Mercedes 
automobile with funds obtained by borrowing on margin against 
Anna Lee's trust funds. Defendants also reported to other 
financial institutions and entities that Anna Lee's trust funds 
were the personal funds of the Trustee. Defendants knew exactly 
what the Trustee was doing and enabled him to do it. The 
breaches of trust in question, and the losses that resulted to 
the beneficiary, took place under Defendants' watchful eye and 
with their knowing assistance. 
CONCLUSION 
Triable issues of fact exist with regard to Plaintiff's 
standing, whether her claims are time barred and whether 
Defendants had actual knowledge of the breach of trust. 
Consequently, the trial court's summary judgment should be 
reversed, and this matter should be remanded for further 
^ Defendants' comparison of the facts in the present case 
to a hypothetical sale of the stock and subsequent 
misappropriation by the Trustee is misguided. There would have 
been nothing improper about the Trustee selling the stock and 
moving the cash received from the sale to another brokerage house 
or placing the funds in a bank account. Moreover, if the Trustee 
had sold the stock, removed the cash from Dean Witter and 
thereafter converted the funds, Defendants would have had no 
participation in or knowledge of the breach of trust and thus no 
culpability. The present case, however, is entirely 
distinguishable. Defendants were not only aware that the Trustee 
margined and eventually appropriated the Trust funds, they 
enabled him to do so. 
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proceedings• 
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